We present a general contextualistic statistical model for constructing quantum-like representations in physics, cognitive and social sciences, psychology, economy. In this paper we use this model to describe cognitive experiments (in particular, in psychology) to check quantum-like structures of mental processes. The crucial role is played by interference of probabilities corresponding to mental observables. Recently one of such experiments based on recognition of images was performed. This experiment confirmed my prediction on quantum-like behaviour of mind. We present the procedure of constructing the wave function of a cognitive context on the basis of statistical data for two incompatible mental observables. We discuss the structure of state spaces for cognitive systems. In fact, the general contextual probability theory predicts not only quantum-like trigonometric (cos θ) interference of probabilities, but also hyperbolic (cosh θ) interference of probabilities (as well as hyper-trigonometric). In principle, statistical data obtained in experiments with cognitive systems can produce hyperbolic (cosh θ) interference of probabilities. At the moment there are no experimental confirmations of hyperbolic interference for cognitive systems.
Introduction
The use of statistical methods in cognitive sciences and psychology induces the idea that quantum-like models can be useful to describe mental states. From the beginning we should underline that for us quantum theory is merely a special theory of statistical averages. This is so called statistical (or ensemble) interpretation of quantum mechanics (Einsteinian interpretation). Of course, various interpretations of quantum mechanics have been debated for a long time. But in the quantum community there is still no common view to this problem, see, e.g., [1] - [16] for recent debates. The Einsteinian interpretation is not the conventional one. The conventional interpretation is so called Copenhagen interpretation by which a quantum state is related to an individual quantum system.
But independently of interpretation one of the main experimental consequences of quantum probabilistic behaviour is interference of probabilities, see, e.g., [17] , [18] and see, e.g., [19] , [20] for the detailed analysis. In classical statistical physics the probability of the event C = A or B, where A and B are alternatives, is equal to the sum of probabilities. In quantum physics there appears an additional additive term, interference term. By using such a statistical viewpoint to quantum theory we can use its methods not only to describe measurements on elementary particles, but also on other systems which might demonstrate quantum-like probabilistic behaviour, see [21] . We underline from the beginning that:
Our quantum-like mental model do not have any direct coupling with quantum reductionist models, see, e.g., [22] - [33] , in that cognitive processes are reduced to quantum mechanical processes in microworld! (e.g. quantum gravity).
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In the opposite to [22] - [33] , in our approach the main motivation to use the quantum-like formalism for mental measurements is not the microstructure of cognitive systems (and, in particular, brains) which are composed of elementary particles (described by quantum mechanics), but high sensitivity of cognitive systems as macroscopic information systems.
In fact, my contextualistic statistical approach to mental reality might be seen as rather "plane." I do not expect mysteries, puzzles and paradoxes.
3 I just paid attention [19] , [20] that by using a modification of the formula of total probability we can represent statistical data by complex or hyperbolic amplitudes (or in the abstract formalism in complex and hyperbolic Hilbert spaces). And the origin of data does not play any role. Thus complex and hyperbolic representations of data can be used not only in physics, but in biology, cognitive sciences, psychology,... By using such a representation we can apply powerful mathematical methods of conventional quantum formalism 4 , for example, in cognitive sciences. This possibility is discussed in the present paper. In principle, the notion of context can be considered as a generalization of a widely used in quantum physics the notion of preparation procedure [36] . I prefer to use contextualistic and not preparation terminology. By using the preparation terminology we presuppose the presence of an experimenter preparing systems for a measurement. By using the contextualistic terminology we need not appeal to experimental preparations, experimenter should appear only on the stage of a measurement. Of course, there exist experimental contexts -preparation procedures. However, in general contexts are important to underline, that despite the presence of a 'wave function' ψ(x) in our model, it has nothing to do with quantum logic models of thinking, see e.g. Orlov [22] . By quantum logic model brain is in a superposition of a few mental states described by a wave function. The collapse of the wave function (self-measurement) gives the realization of one concrete mental state. This is quantum logical process of thinking. In our model we do not use the notion of collapse of a wave function. The process of thinking (in the opposite to quantum logic approach) is not a series of self-measurements.
3 Some results of this paper were presented in author's talks at the conferences "Mysteries, puzzles and paradoxes in quantum mechanics-4", Gargnano-2004 (Italy), "Towards a Science of Consciousness" (Shövde-2001, Tucson-2002 and Prague-2003) and "Kolmogorov-100", Moscow-2004. 4 We speak about statistical data which can be represented by complex amplitudes. Corresponding mathematical methods for hyperbolic statistical data are not yet well developed. not coupled to preparation procedures. I consider contexts as elements of reality which exist independently of experimenters.
5 This is the cornerstone of my contextualistic viewpoint to reality:
Contexts are elements of reality To construct a concrete model M of reality, we should fix some set of contexts C, see definition 2.
Remark 1. (Copenhagen and Växjö contextualisms) Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics is considered as contextualistic, see [13] for detailed analysis. However, we should sharply distinguish two types of contextualism: Copenhagen and Växjö contextualisms. For N. Bohr "context" had the meaning "context of a measurement". For example, in his answer to the EPR challenge N. Bohr pointed out that position can be determined only in context of position measurement.
For me "context" has the meaning a complex of physical conditions. As was underlined, a context is an element of physical reality and it has no direct relation to measurements (or existence of experimenters at all). 6 Moreover, a Bohrian measurement context is always macroscopic, our context -a complex of physical conditions -need not be macroscopic or even physical.
Observables.
Suppose that there is fixed a set of observables O such that any observable a ∈ O can be measured under a complex of (e.g., cognitive) conditions C for any C ∈ C.
We remark that our general Växjö-representation of reality does not contain systems. At the moment we do not (and need not) consider observables as observables on systems. It is only supposed that if a context C is fixed then for any instant of time t we can perform a measurement of any observable 5 We use the notion "elements of reality" in its common sense. There is no direct coupling with the EPR sufficient condition for values of physical observables to be elements of physical reality, see [36] . Moreover, in general the Växjö model need not contain systems. Thus even the formulation of the question: "Can values of observables be considered as objective properties of physical systems?" is in general meaningless. We shall come to the problem of reality of observables as observables on systems in section 2.9 in which we shall present the Växjö model completed by systems. 6 We remark that so far we do not speak about an interpretation of quantum mechanics. We are presenting an approach to modeling of, e.g., physical or mental reality. The quantum representation is possible only for some class of models, M quantum . We recall that such a representation is based on generalized formula of total probability having the interference term, [19] , [20] , see sections 3. The class M quantum is a very special subclass of the class of contextualistic statistical models. For example, there exist contextualistic statistical models which cannot be represented in a complex Hilbert space -so called hyperbolic quantum-like models, [19] , [20] , [37] , see section 4.
a ∈ O.
We do not assume that all these observables can be measured simultaneously; so they need not be compatible. The sets of observables O and contexts C are coupled through Axiom 1: For any observable a ∈ O, there are well defined contexts C α corresponding to α-filtrations: if we perform a measurement of a under the complex of physical conditions C α , then we obtain the value a = α with probability 1. It is supposed that the set of contexts C contains filtrationcontexts C α for all observables a ∈ O.
Probabilistic representation of contexts. Axiom 2:
There are defined contextual probabilities P(a = α/C) for any context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O.
At the moment we do not fix a definition of probability. Depending on a choice of probability theory we can obtain different models. For any C ∈ C, there is defined the set of probabilities:
We complete this probabilistic data by C x , C y ,...-contextual probabilities corresponding to values a = x, b = y, ... of observables O :
(we remark that D(O, C) does not contain the simultaneous probability distribution of observables O). Data D(O, C) gives a probabilistic image of the context C through the system of observables O. Probabilities P(a = x/C y ), ... play the role of structural constants of a model. We denote by the symbol
There is defined the map:
In general this map is not one-to-one. Thus the π-image of contextualistic reality is very rough: not all contexts can be distinguished with the aid of probabilistic data produced by the class of observables O.
Mathematically such probabilistic data can be represented in various ways. In some special cases it is possible to represent this data by complex amplitudes. In this way we obtain the probabilistic formalism of quantum mechanics. In other cases it is possible to represent data by hyperbolic amplitudes. We obtain the probabilistic formalism of "hyperbolic quantum mechanics," [37] .
Contextualistic statistical model (Växjö model). Definition 2. A contextualistic statistical model of reality is a triple
where C 2.5. Realist interpretation of reference observables. Our general model can (but, in principle, need not) be completed by some interpretation of reference observables a ∈ O. By the Växjö interpretation reference observables are interpreted as properties of contexts:
"If an observation of a under a complex of conditions C ∈ C gives the result a = x, then this value is interpreted as the objective property of the context C (at the moment of the observation)."
As always, a model is not sensitive to interpretation. Therefore, instead of the realistic Växjö interpretation, we might use the Bohrian measurementcontextualistic interpretation, see Remark 1. However, by assuming the reality of contexts it would be natural to assume also the reality of observables which are used for the statistical representation of contexts. Thus we use the realistic interpretation both for contexts and reference observables. This is Växjö realism.
2.6. On the role of reference observables. Reader has already paid attention that reference observables play the special role in our model. I interpret the set O as a family of observables which represent some fixed class of properties of contexts belonging C. For example, such a family can be chosen by some class of cognitive systems Z cogn -"observers" -which have been interested only in the O-properties of contexts C (and in the process of evolution they developed the ability to "feel" these and only these properties of contexts). The latter does not mean that observables O are not realistic. I would like just to say that observers τ ∈ Z cogn use (are able to use) only observables O.
There can exist other properties of contexts C which are not represented by observables O. The same set of contexts C can be the basis of various models of contextual reality: C) ), i = 1, 2, .... For example, such models can be created by various classes of cognitive systems Z cogn,i .
Moreover, we may exclude the spiritual element from observables. By considering "observation" as "feeling"of a context C by some system τ we need not presuppose that τ is a cognitive system. Such a τ can be, e.g., a physical system (e.g. an electron) which "feel" a context C (e.g., electromagneticcontext), cf. Remark 2.
Remark 2. (Mind-matter problem) In fact, in the contextualistic statistical model we need not distinguish physical and mental elements in reality of contexts. The typical cognitive context is neither purely physical nor purely mental. Such a context contains a brain or a few brains (or some neuronal networks) as well as mental structures -minds, feelings,... Thus in the contextualistic model of reality we need not appeal to mind-matter dualism. However, then on the level of measurement we can introduce two different types of reference observables -physical and mental observables: In the same way as in physics in some special cases it is possible to encode such data by complex amplitudes. In this way we obtain representations of some biological, cognitive, social, economic,.... models in complex Hilbert spaces. We call them complex quantum-like models. These models describe the usual cos-interference of probabilities. We recall again that such a representation is based on a generalized formula of total probability having the interference term, see section 3.
Thus, when we speak, e.g., about a quantum-like mental model, this has nothing to do with quantum mechanics for electrons, photons, ... contained in the brain, see [21] for detail. A quantum-like mental model is a contextualistic probabilistic model of brain and nothing more, [21] , cf. [22] - [33] . Recently we found quantum-like statistics in some psychological contextual experiments, see [39] ; such statistical data also can be generated by some games, [40] (which have been called "quantum-like games" in [40] ). In other cases it is possible to encode probabilistic data D(O, C) by hyperbolic amplitudes. These are amplitudes taking values in so called hyperbolic algebras -two dimensional Clifford algebras. In this way we obtain representations of some biological, social, economic,.... models in hyperbolic Hilbert spaces. We call them hyperbolic quantum-like models. These models describe the coshinterference of probabilities. But we do not have yet experimental evidences of such statistical behaviour in cognitive sciences or psychology.
2.8. Choice of a probability model. As was mentioned, any Växjö model M should be combined on some concrete probabilistic model describing probabilistic data D(O, C). Of course, the Kolmogorov measuretheoretical model dominates in modern science. However, this is not the only possible model for probability, see [41] for an extended review. In particular, I strongly support using of the frequency (von Mises) model [42] , see also [41] .
2.9. Systems, ensemble representation. We now complete the contextualistic statistical model by considering systems ω (e.g., physical or cognitive, or social,..) Systems are also elements of realty. In our model a context C ∈ C is represented by an ensemble S C of systems which have been interacted with C. For such systems we shall use notation:
The set of all (e.g., physical or cognitive, or social) systems which are used to represent all contexts C ∈ C is denoted by the symbol Ω ≡ Ω(C). Thus we have a map:
This is the ensemble representation of contexts. We set S ≡ S(C) = {S : S = S C , C ∈ C}.
The ensemble representation of contexts is given by the map (3)
We remark that this map need not be one-to-one. Reference observables O are interpreted as observables on systems ω ∈ Ω. In principle, we can interpret values of observables as objective properties of systems. So in this paper the reference mental observables can be considered as objective properties of cognitive systems. Oppositely to the very common opinion, such models (with realistic observables) can have nontrivial quantum-like representations (in complex and hyperbolic Hilbert spaces) which are based on the formula of total probability with interference terms. Probabilities are defined as ensemble probabilities, see [41] and section 3 for detail.
Definition 3. The ensemble representation of a contextualistic statistical model M = (C, O, D(O, C)) is a triple
S(M) = (S, O, D(O, C))(4)
where S is a set of ensembles representing contexts C, O is a set of observables, and D(O, C) is probabilistic data about ensembles S obtained with the aid of observables O.
3 Test on quantum-like structure of mental statistics 3.1. Observables. We describe mental interference experiment. Let a = x 1 , x 2 and b = y 1 , y 2 be two dichotomous mental observables 8 : x 1 ='yes', x 2 ='no', y 1 ='yes', y 2 ='no'. We set X = {x 1 , x 2 }, Y = {y 1 , y 2 } ("spectra" of observables a and b). Observables can be two different questions or two different types of cognitive tasks. We use these two fixed reference observables for probabilistic representation of cognitive contextual reality. 8 Due to Remark 2 we use the terminology "cognitive contexts" and "mental observables." In principle, there also can be considered physical observables (e.g., the position and momentum) on cognitive systems. 9 Of course, by choosing another set of reference observables in general we shall obtain another representation of cognitive contextual reality. Can we find "the most natural" mental reference observables? It is a very hard question. In physics everything is clear: the position and momentum give us the natural pair of reference observables. Which mental observables can be chosen as mental analogous of the position and momentum? 3.2. Cognitive and social contexts. Let C be a cognitive context: 1). C can be some selection procedure which is used to select a special group S C of people or animals. Such a context is represented by this group S C . For example, we select a group S prof.math. of professors of mathematics (and then ask questions a or (and) b or give corresponding tasks). We can select a group of people of some age. We can select a group of people having a "special mental state": for example, people in love or hungry people (and then ask questions or give tasks).
2). C can be a learning procedure which is used to create some special group of people or animals. For example, rats can be trained to react to special stimulus.
3). C can be a collection of painting, C painting , and people interact with C painting by looking at pictures(and then there are asked questions abou this collection to those people ).
4). C can be, for example, "context of classical music", C cl.mus. , and people interact with C cl.mus. be listening in to this music. In principle, we need not use an ensemble of different people. It can be one person whom we ask questions each time after he has listened in to CD (or radio) with classical music. In the latter case we should use not ensemble, but frequency (von Mises [42] ) definition of probability.
The last example is an important illustration why from the beginning we prefer to start with the general contextualistic ideology and only then we consider the possibility to represent contexts by ensembles of systems. A cognitive context should not be identified with an ensemble of cognitive systems representing this context. For us C cl.mus. is by itself an element of reality. We would like to say "mental reality", but in accordance with Remark 2, it is better to say "cognitive reality" by having in mind that C cl.mus. contains not only mental elements, but also some material structure for acoustic waves.
We can also consider social contexts. For example, social classes: proletariatcontext, bourgeois-context; or war-context, revolution-context, context of economic depression, poverty-context and so on. Thus our model can be used in social and political sciences (and even in history). We can try to find quantum-like statistical data in these sciences.
3.3. Experiments. We perform observations of a under the complex of cognitive conditions C : p a (x) = the number of results a = x the total number of observations , x ∈ X.
So p a (x) is the probability to get the result x for observation of the a under the complex of cognitive conditions C.
In the same way we find probabilities p b (y) for the b-observation under the same cognitive context C.
Probabilities can be ensemble probabilities or they can be time averages for measurements over one concrete person (e.g., each time after listening in to classical music). Measurements can be even self-measurements. For example, I can ask myself questions a or b each time when I fall in love. These should be "hard questions" (incompatible questions). By giving, e.g., the answer a = 'yes ′ , I should make some important decision. It will play an important role when I shall answer to the subsequent question b and vice versa.
As was supposed in section 1, we have cognitive contexts C y corresponding to selections with respect to values of the b-observable. By measuring the b-observable under the cognitive context C y we shall obtain the answer b = y with probability one. We perform now the a-measurements under cognitive contexts C y for y = y 1 , y 2 , and find the probabilities: For example, by using the ensemble approach to probability we have that the probability p a/b (x 1 /y 2 ) is obtained as the frequency of the answer a = x 1 = 'yes ′ in the ensemble of cognitive system that have already answered b = y 2 = 'no ′ . It is assumed (and this is a very natural assumption) that a cognitive system is "responsible for her (his) answers." Suppose that a system τ has answered b = y 2 = 'no ′ . If we ask τ again the same question b we shall get the same answer b = y 2 = 'no ′ . In quantum mechanics such measurements are called measurements of first kind. It was Dirac's idea [15] that a second measurement of the same observable, performed immediately after the first one, will yield the same value of the observable.
The classical probability theory tells us that all these probabilities have to be connected by the so called formula of total probability, see, e.g., [43] :
However, if the theory is quantum-like, then we should obtain [19] , [20] the formula of total probability with an interference term:
Here θ(x) is the phase of the a-interference between cognitive contexts C and C y , y ∈ Y. In the experiment on the quantum-like statistical test for a cognitive context C we calculate
If cos θ(x) = 0, then we would get the strongest argument in the support of quantum-like behaviour of cognitive systems. In this case, starting with (experimentally calculated) cos θ(x) we can proceed to the Hilbert space formalism, see [19] , [20] . We could introduce a 'mental wave function' ψ (or pure quantum-like mental state) belonging to this Hilbert space, see section 5.
We recall that in our approach a 'mental wave function' ψ describes cognitive context C. This is nothing other than a special mathematical encoding of probabilistic information about this contexts which can be obtained with the aid of reference observables a and b. The next step would be to find mental energy operators and describe by Schrödinger equation the evolution of mental state, compare to [21] . For further considerations (on a wave function) it is important to underline that all above quantities depend on a cognitive context C :
C (x) We remark that in the ordinary quantum theory p a/b (x/y) does not depend on the original context C, i.e., a context preceding the b = y filtration. In quantum theory any b = y filtration destroys the memory on the preceding physical context C. We do not know the situation for cognitive systems. Of course, everything would depend on the choice of mental observables a and b. Our conjecture is that :
There exist mental observables a and b such that the probability p a/b (x/y) depends only on the context C y .
Hyperbolic interference of minds
In fact, the general contextual probability theory (developed by the author, see [19] , [20] ) predicts not only quantum-like trigonometric (cos θ) interference of probabilities, but also hyperbolic (cosh θ) interference of probabilities.
In principle, statistical data obtained in experiments with cognitive systems can produce hyperbolic (cosh θ) interference of probabilities. In general quantities
can extend 1 (see [19] , [20] for examples). In this case we can introduce a hyperbolic phase parameter θ ∈ [0, ∞) such that
In this case we can not proceed to the ordinary Hilbert space formalism. Nevertheless, we can use an analog of the complex Hilbert space representation for probabilities. Probabilities corresponding such cognitive contexts can be represented in a hyperbolic Hilbert space -module over a two-dimensional Clifford algebra, see [37] .
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In principle it may occur that |λ 1 | ≤ 1 and |λ 2 | > 1 or vice versa. In this case we obtain hyper-trigonometric interference of minds.
Mental wave function
Let C be a cognitive context. We consider only cognitive contexts with trigonometric interference (for mental observables a and b). The interference formula of total probability (5) can be written in the following form
By using the elementary formula:
we can represent the probability p b C (x) as the square of the complex amplitude:
10 At the moment there are no experimental confirmations of hyperbolic interference for cognitive systems. If such a result was obtained it would imply that cognitive systems have more rich probabilistic structure than quantum systems.
where
Here phases ξ C (x/y) are such that
We denote the space of functions: ϕ : X → C by the symbol E = Φ(X, C). Since X = {y 1 , y 2 }, the E is the two dimensional complex linear space. Dirac's δ−functions {δ(y 1 − x), δ(y 2 − x)} form the canonical basis in this space. For each ϕ ∈ E we have
Denote by the symbol C tr the set of all cognitive contexts having the trigonometric statistical behaviour with respect to mental observables a and b. By using the representation (8) we construct the map
whereΦ(X, C) is the space of equivalent classes of functions under the equivalence relation: ϕ equivalent ψ iff ϕ = tψ, t ∈ C,|t| = 1.
To fix some concrete representation of a context C, we can choose, e.g., ξ C (x/y 1 ) = 0 and ξ C (x/y 2 ) = θ C (x). Thus we construct the map
The J b/a maps cognitive contexts into complex amplitudes. The representation (7) of probability as the square of the absolute value of the complex (b/a)−amplitude is nothing other than the famous Born rule.
The complex amplitude ϕ C can be called a mental wave function. We set
The representation (7) can be rewritten in the following form:
where the scalar product in the space E = Φ(X, C) is defined by the standard formula:
The system of functions {e b x } x∈X is an orthonormal basis in the Hilbert space H = (E, (·, ·)) Let X ⊂ R. By using the Hilbert space representation of Born's rule (10) we obtain for the Hilbert space representation of the expectation of the (Kolmogorovian) random variable a:
whereâ : Φ(X, C) → Φ(X, C) is the multiplication operator. This operator can also be determined by its eigenvectors:âe a x = xe a x , x ∈ X. We notice that if the matrix of transition probabilities P a/b = (p a/b (x/y)) is double stochastic we can represent the mental observable b by a symmetric operatorb in the same Hilbert space. In general operatorsâ andb do not commute.
Structure the set of states of mental systems
We recall few basic notions of the statistical formalism of quantum theory, see, e.g., [44] or [45] . States of quantum systems are mathematically represented by density operators -positive operators ρ of unit trace. Pure states (wave functions) ψ are represented by vectors belonging to the unit sphere of a Hilbert space -corresponding density operators ρ ψ are the orthogonal projectors onto one dimensional subspaces corresponding to vectors ψ. The set D of states (density operators) is a convex set. In the two dimensional case (corresponding to dichotomous observables -'yes' or 'no' answers) the set D can be represented as the unit ball in the three dimensional real space R 3 . Pure states are represented as the unit sphere, Bloch sphere. Here the whole set D is the convex hall of the Bloch sphere S, i.e., of the set of pure states.
In our quantum-like mental model some contexts (producing trigonometric interference) are represented by points in S. We can also consider statistical mixtures of these pure states. Let S C tr = J b/a (C tr ) (the image of the set of populations C tr ). Then the set of mental states D C tr coincides with the convex hall of the S C tr . There are no reasons to suppose that S C tr would coincide with the Bloch sphere S. Thus there is no reasons to suppose that the set of mental quantum-like states D C tr would coincide with the set of quantum states D. It is the fundamental problem 11 to describe the set of pure quantum-like metal states S C tr for various classes of cognitive systems.
We might speculate that S P depends essentially on a class of cognitive system. So S human P does not equal to S leon P . We can even speculate that in the process of evolution the set S P have been increasing and S human P is the maximal set of mental states. It might even occur that S human P coincides with the Bloch sphere.
